Portuguese presidential election 2026: Observing the Formation of a Momentum
The Portuguese presidential election on January 18, 2026, appears on the surface to be routine democratic procedure. However, observing the data changes over the past three years reveals a noteworthy pattern.
The Trajectory Presented by Data
Changes in Chega’s seats across the past three legislative elections:
- 2022: 12 seats (5.2%)
- 2024: 50 seats (21.7%)
- 2025: 60 seats (26.1%, second-largest party in parliament)
Changes in the traditional left during the same period:
- PS: 120 seats → 77 seats → 58 seats
- BE: 9 seats → 5 seats → 1 seat
- CDU: 12 seats → 4 seats → 3 seats
Current parliamentary structure (230 seats total):
- AD (center-right alliance): 91 seats
- Chega: 60 seats
- PS: 58 seats
Two observations:
- AD + Chega = 151 seats, just 2 seats short of the 2/3 majority (153 seats) required for constitutional amendments.
- The left combined totals approximately 70 seats, declining from 61% to 30% over three years.
The Presidential Election as a Node
The latest polling on January 11 shows a technical tie:
- Seguro (PS): 21.4%
- Cotrim (IL): 21.1%
- Ventura (Chega): 19.7%
- Gouveia e Melo (independent): 17.0%
Notably, there’s been a shift in voter expectations: increasingly more people believe Ventura will win. This “perceived winner” effect in elections often becomes self-reinforcing.
Institutional Constraints and Historical References
Portugal’s structural characteristics:
- Semi-presidential system with limited presidential powers; actual executive authority rests with the Prime Minister
- Constitutional Court judges require 2/3 parliamentary approval for appointment
- EU membership provides external constraints
- Military operates within NATO framework and has been depoliticized
However, Hungary’s experience also warrants consideration: after Orbán’s Fidesz obtained a 2/3 majority in 2010, they achieved gradual institutional transformation within the EU framework through electoral law modifications, Constitutional Court packing, and control of public media. The EU’s Article 7 sanction mechanism is limited by unanimity requirements and has proven ineffective.
Venezuela’s Chávez model was more radical (1999 constitutional assembly, Supreme Court packing, 2009 removal of term limits), but that occurred in a presidential system without external constraints. Portugal’s institutional setup differs, yet the path of gradual erosion is not impossible.
Three Possible Paths
Based on current trajectories, depending on which candidate wins on 1/18, possible branches may emerge:
Path One: Cotrim Wins
As the IL (Liberal Initiative) candidate, he is compatible with AD on economic policy while relatively liberal on social issues. As representative of a new party (founded 2019), he doesn’t carry old establishment baggage.
As president, he has convening power to facilitate an AD-PS grand coalition (totaling 149 seats). This would isolate Chega (60 seats) and break its “anti-establishment” narrative. European precedents exist: Germany’s CDU-SPD grand coalitions against AfD, Austria’s ÖVP-SPÖ against FPÖ.
A grand coalition could govern stably and push structural reforms (housing, labor market). If living conditions improve, Chega’s appeal may decline.
Path Two: Seguro Wins
Traditional center-left approach, can consolidate the left and stabilize PS. However, as someone within the PS establishment, his promotion of a grand coalition would be viewed by AD as a partisan move. More likely outcome: AD minority government + PS case-by-case support, maintaining stability but not optimal.
Path Three: Ventura Wins
This would produce a legitimacy effect. Chega could reach 75-85 seats in the next legislative election (2026/2027). Government formation would then have only three possibilities: AD-Chega coalition, Chega minority government, or AD held hostage by Chega through budget votes. Regardless, Chega enters the power core.
If AD+Chega reaches 2/3, the technical possibility of institutional erosion exists: packing the Constitutional Court, modifying electoral law, influencing media ecology, gradual constitutional amendments. This isn’t an overnight coup but a 5-8 year process.
Time Frame
If Ventura wins and Chega maintains current growth rate:
- Within 2-3 years: Chega may become the largest party or kingmaker
- Within 3-6 years: If supermajority is achieved, institutional adjustments begin
- Within 6-10 years: Portugal may become competitive authoritarianism
Conclusion
This election’s significance lies not in the presidential office’s power itself, but in its potential to catalyze or halt a momentum. The data shows a clear trajectory; the question is whether this trajectory will accelerate or be interrupted after 1/18.
As an observer, I lean toward Cotrim because he’s most likely to facilitate a structural counter-strategy. But the final choice belongs to the voters.
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